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f i f t e e n
Social Consequences of Common 
Ground
N. j. Enfield
The pursuit and exploitation of mutual knowledge, shared expecta­tions, and other types of common ground (Clark 1996; Lewis 1969; 
Smith 1980)1 not only serves the mutual management of referential 
information, but has important consequences in the realm of social, 
interpersonal affiliation. The informational and social-affiliational 
functions of common ground are closely interlinked. I argue in this 
chapter that the management of information in communication is 
never without social consequence and that many of the details of 
communicative practice are therefore dedicated to the management 
of social affiliation in human relationships.
Common ground constitutes the open stockpile of shared presumption 
that fuels amplicative inference in communication (Grice 1989), 
driven by intention attribution and other defining components of the 
interaction engine (Levinson 1995, 2000, this volume). Any occasion of 
"grounding" (i.e., any increment of common ground) has consequences 
for future interaction of the individuals involved, thanks to two per­
petually active imperatives for individuals in social interaction. The 
informational imperative compels individuals to cooperate with their inter­
actional partners in maintaining a common referential understanding, 
mutually calibrated at each step of an interaction's progression. Here, 
common ground affords economy of expression. The greater our 
common ground, the less effort we have to expend to satisfy the 
informational imperative. Second (but not secondary), the affiliational 
imperative compels interlocutors to maintain a common degree of 
interpersonal affiliation (trust, commitment, intimacy), proper to the
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status of the relationship, and again mutually calibrated at each step of 
an interaction's progression. In this second dimension, the economy 
of expression enabled by common ground affords a public display of 
intimacy, a reliable indicator of how much is personally shared by a 
given pair (trio, n-tuple) of interactants. In these two ways, serving the 
ends of informational economy and affiliational intimacy, to increment 
common ground is to invest in a resource that will be drawn on later, 
with interest.
Sources of Common Ground
A canonical source of common ground is joint attention, a unique 
human practice that fuses perception and inferential cognition (Moore 
and Dunham 1995; Tomasello 1999, this volume). In joint attention, 
two or more people simultaneously attend to a single external stimulus, 
together, each conscious that the experience is shared. Figure 15.1 
illustrates a typical, everyday joint attentional scene.
In this example, the fact that a washing machine is standing in front 
of these women is incontrovertibly in common ground thanks both to 
its physical position in the perceptual field of both interactants and to its
Figure  15.1. Joint attention on washing machine console.
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operating panel being the target of joint attentional hand gestures (Kita 
2003; Liszkowski this volume). But common ground is also there when 
it is not being signaled or otherwise manifest directly. At a personal 
level, the shared experiences of interactants are in common ground as 
long as the interactants know (and remember!) they were shared. At 
a cultural level, common ground may be indexed by signs of ethnic 
identity, and the common cultural background such signs may entail. 
One such marker is native dialect (as signaled, e.g., by accent), a readily 
detectable and reliable indicator of long years of common social and 
cultural experience (Nettle and Dunbar 1997; Nettle 1999). Suppose I 
begin a conversational exchange with a stranger of similar age to myself, 
who, like me, is a native speaker of Australian English. We will each 
immediately recognize this common native origin from each other's 
speech, and then I can be pretty sure that my new interlocutor and I 
will share vast cultural common ground from at least the core years 
of our linguistic and cultural socialization (i.e., our childhoods, when 
our dialects were acquired). We will mutually assume, for instance, 
recognition of expressions like fair dinkum, names like Barry Crocker, 
and possibly even sporting institutions like the Dapto Dogs.
Common Ground as Fuel for Gricean Amplicative 
Inference
Common ground is a resource that speakers exploit in inviting and 
deriving pragmatic inference, as a way to cut costs of speech production 
by leaving much to be inferred by the listener. As Levinson (2000) 
points out, the rate of transfer of coded information in speech is slow, 
thanks to our articulatory apparatus. Psychological processes run much 
faster. This bottleneck problem is solved by the amplicative properties 
of pragmatic inference (Levinson 2000; cf. Grice 1975). Interpretative 
amplification of coded messages feeds directly on the stock of common 
ground, in which we may include a language's semantically coded 
linguistic categories (lexicon, morphosyntax), a community's set of 
cultural practices and norms (Levinson 1995:240; Enfield 2002:234- 
236), and shared personal experience. (This implies different categories 
of social relationship, defined in part by amount and type of common 
ground: e.g., speakers of our language, people of our culture, and 
personal associates of various types; see below.) The more common 
ground we share, the less constrained we are in communication. Hanks 
(1989:118) captures this notion in his "principle of relative symmetry" 
(see also Kockelman 2005:289 and passim on "symmetry of attitudes"),
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by which greater common ground licenses a greater range of semiotic 
possibilities for referential differentiation.
This logic of communicative economy—intention attribution via 
inference fed by common ground—is complemented by the use of 
convention to simplify problems of social coordination (Clark 1996; 
Lewis 1969; Schelling 1960). Although we have access at all times to 
the powerful higher-order reasoning that makes common ground and 
intention attribution possible, we keep cognition frugal by assuming 
defaults where possible (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Sperber and Wilson 1995; 
cf. Barr and Keysar 2004). So, if tomorrow is our weekly appointment 
(midday Joe's) we do not have to discuss where and when to meet. 
The hypothesis that we will meet at Joe's at midday has been tested 
before,2 and confirmed. And we further entrench the convention by 
behaving in accordance with it (i.e., by turning up at Joe's at midday 
and finding each other there).
Consider a simple example from everyday interaction in rural Laos, 
which illustrates common ground from both natural and cultural 
sources playing a role in inference making. Figure 15.2 is from a video 
recording of conversation among speakers of Lao in a lowland village 
near Vientiane, Laos. (The corners of the image are obscured by a 
lens hood.) The image shows a woman (foreground, right; hereafter, 
Foreground Woman [FW]) who has just finished a complex series of 
preparations to chew betel nut, involving various ingredients and tools 
kept in the basket visible in the lower foreground. In this frame, FW 
is shifting back, mouth full with a betel nut package, having finished 
with the basket and placed it aside, to her left.
Immediately after this, the woman in the background, at far right 
(Background Woman [BW]), moves forward, to reach in the direction 
of the basket, as shown in Figs 15.3a, b.
BW's forward-reaching action gives rise to an inference by FW that 
BW wants the basket.3 We can tell FW has made this inference from 
the fact that she grasps the basket and passes it to BW in Fig. 15.4. And 
we can tell, in addition, from what she says next, in line 1 of (1), that 
she infers BW wants to chew betel nut (the numbers at the end of each 
Lao word mark lexical tone distinctions).
(1) 1 FW caw4 khiaw4vaa3 
2sg chew q?
"You chew?"
2 BW mm 5 
mm
"Mm." (i.e. "Yep.")
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Figure 15.2. Conversation 
among Lao speakers, lowland Laos. 
Foreground Woman shifts back 
having finished preparations to 
chew betel nut (in basket, lower 
foreground).
Figure 15.3. Background Woman 
moves forward to reach in direction 
of basket (lower foreground).
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Figure 15.4. Foreground Woman passes basket to Background Woman, 
inferring the goal of her reaching forward.
FW infers more than one thing from the forward-reaching action of 
BW shown in Fig. 15.3. It would seem hardly culture specific that BW 
is taken to be wanting the basket. (But an inference or projection is 
nevertheless being made; after all, she may have wanted to rub a spot 
of dirt off the floor where the basket was sitting.) More specific to the 
common ground that comes with this cultural setting, BW's reaching 
for the basket is basis for an inference that she wants to chew betel 
nut (and not, for instance, that she wants to reorganize the contents 
of the basket, or tip it out, or put it away, or spit into it). The inference 
that BW wants to chew betel nut is made explicit in the proposition in 
line 1 "you chew." The added sentence-final "evidential interrogative" 
particle vaa3 (Enfield n.d.) makes explicit, in addition, that it is an 
inference. The particle vaa3 encodes the notion that an inference has 
been made, and seeks confirmation that this inference is correct: that 
is, in a sequence X vaa3, the meaning of vaa3 can be paraphrased along 
the lines "Something makes me think X is the case, you should say 
something now to confirm this." BW responds appropriately with a 
minimal spoken confirmation in line 2.
The two inferences made in this example—one, that BW's forward 
movement indicates that she wants to take hold of something in front 
of her, and two, that she wants to have the basket to chew betel nut—are 
launched from different types of categorical knowledge (although they 
are both based on the attribution of intention through recognition of 
an agent's "attitude"; Mead 1934, see also Kockelman 2005). The first 
is a general stock of typifications determined naturally, essentially by
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biology: naive physics, parsing of motor abilities (Byrne this volume), 
frames of interpretation of experience arising through terrestrial fate 
(Levinson 1997:28). A second basis for inference is the set of categories 
learned in culture—here, from the fate of being born in a Lao-speaking 
community, and acquiring the frames, scripts, and scenarios (Schank 
and Abelson 1977) of betel-nut chewing among older ladies in rural 
Laos (e.g., that betel paraphernalia is "free goods" that any middle- 
aged or older woman may reach for in such a setting—had a man or a 
child made the same reaching action here, they would not have been 
taken to be embarking on a betel-chewing session). Both these types 
of knowledge are in the common ground of these interlocutors, in the 
strict sense of being information openly shared.
Grounding for Inferring: The Inform ationally  
Strategic Pursuit of Common Ground
Links between joint attention, common ground, and pragmatic inference 
suggest a process of grounding for inferring, by which the requirements 
of human sociality direct us to tend—while socializing—to dimensions 
of common ground that may be exploited in later socializing.4 This 
formulation highlights the temporality of the connection between 
grounding (i.e., securing common ground) and inferring. Grounding 
is an online process (enabled by joint attention). Later inferring based 
on common ground presupposes or indexes the earlier establishment 
of that common ground (or indexes a presumption of that common 
ground, based on some cue, such as a person's individual identity, or 
some badge of cultural or subcultural identity).
Grounding for inferring takes place at different levels of temporal 
grain—that is, with different time lags between the point of grounding 
and the point of drawing some inference based on that grounding. At a 
very local level, it is observable in the structure of reference management 
through discourse (Fox 1987). Canonically, a referent's first mention is 
done with a full noun phrase (e.g., a name or a descriptive reference), with 
subsequent mentions using a radically reduced form (such as a pronoun; 
recorded example from Fox 1987:20, transcription simplified):
(2) A: Did they get rid of Kuhleznik yet?
B: No in fact I know somebody who has her now.
Forms like her do not identify or describe their referent. Their refer­
ence must be retrieved by inference or other indexical means. This is
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straightforward when a full form for the antecedent is immediately prior, 
as in (2). But if you miss the initial reference, lacking the common ground 
required for inferring what her must be referring to, you might be lost. 
Without the benefit of informative hand gestures or other contextual 
cues, you are likely to have to disrupt the flow of talk by asking for 
grounding, to be able to make the required referential inferences.
At a step up in temporal distance between grounding and payoff 
are forward-looking "setups" in conversational interaction (Jefferson 
1978; Sacks 1974; cf. Goodwin's "prospective indexicals"; Goodwin 
1996:384), which, for instance, alert listeners to the direction in which a 
speaker's narrative is heading. When I say Her brother is so strange, let me 
tell you what he did last week, you as listener will then need to monitor 
my narrative for something that is sufficiently strange to count as the 
promised key illustration of her brother's strangeness, and thus the 
punch line. What constitutes "her brother's strangeness" is "not yet 
available to recipients but is instead something that has to be discovered 
subsequently as the interaction proceeds" (Goodwin 1996:384). When 
you hear what you think is this punch line, you will likely surmise that 
the story is at completion. Your response will be shaped by a second 
function of the prospective expression, namely, as a forewarning of the 
appropriate type of appraisal that the story seeks as a response or receipt. 
So, He's so strange, let me tell you... will rightly later elicit an appreciation 
that is fitted to the projected assessment; for example, Wow, how strange. 
Setup expressions of this kind are one type of grounding for inferring, 
with both structural-informational functions (putting in the open the 
fact that the speaker is engaged in a sustained and directed activity 
of telling—e.g., "how strange her brother is"), and social-affiliational 
functions (putting in the open the speaker's stance toward the narrated 
situation, which facilitates the production of affiliative, or at least fitted 
response). Both these functions help constrain a listener's subsequent 
interpretation as appropriate to the interaction, at a discourse level.
All the way at the other end of the scale in temporal distance between 
grounding and its payoff are those acts of building common ground 
that look ahead into the interactional future of the people involved. 
At a personal level, our efforts to maintain and build common ground 
have significant consequences for the type of relationship we succeed in 
ongoingly maintaining, that is, whether we are socially close or distant 
(see below). At a cultural level, in children's socialization we spend a lot 
of time explaining and acting out for children "what people do," "what 
people say," and "how things are." This builds the cultural common
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ground that will soon streamline an individual's passage through the 
moment-by-moment course of their social life.
Semiotics: Cognition and Perception, Structure, and  
Emergence
A matter of some contention in the discussions documented in this 
volume is the degree of involvement of higher-order cognition in social 
interactional processes. Despite currency of the term "mind reading" 
and its variants in literature on social intelligence (Baron-Cohen 1995; 
Carruthers and Smith 1996; inter alia; cf. Astington this volume), we 
cannot read each other's minds. Miller wrote, "One of the psychologist's 
great methodological difficulties is how he can make the events he 
wishes to study publicly observable, countable, measurable" (1951:3). 
This problem for the psychologist is a problem for the layperson too. 
In interaction, normal people need, at some level, to be able to model 
each other's (evolving and contingent) goals, based solely on perceptible 
information, by attending to one another's communicative actions and 
displays (Mead 1934). A no-telepathy assumption means that there is 
"no influencing other minds without mediating artifactual structure" 
(Hutchins and Hazlehurst 1995). As a result, semiosis—the interplay of 
perception and cognition, rooted in ethology and blossoming in the 
modern human mind—is a cornerstone of human sociality (Kockelman 
2005; Peirce 1965). Humans augment the ethologically broad base of 
iconic and indexical meaning with symbolic structures and higher-order 
processes of intention attribution.
So if action and perception are the glue in human interaction, higher- 
order cognition is the catalyst. I see this stance as a complement, not 
an alternative, to radically interactionist views of cognition (cf. Molder 
and Potter 2005). Authors like Norman (1991), Hutchins (1995), and 
Goodwin (1994, 1996) are right to insist that the natural exercising 
of cognition is in distributed interaction with external artifacts. And 
we must add to these artifacts our bodies (Enfield 2005; Goodwin 
2000; Hutchins and Palen 1993) and our social associates (Goodwin 
this volume). Similarly, the temporal-logical structures of our social 
interactions are necessarily collaborative in their achievement (Clark 
1996; Schegloff 1982), as maybe our very thought processes (Goody 1995, 
inter alia; Mead 1934; Rogoff 1994; Vygotsky 1962). But as individuals, 
we each physically embody and transport with us the wherewithal to 
move from scene to scene and still make the right contributions. We
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store cognitive representations (whether propositional or embodied) 
of the conventional signs and structures of language, of the cultural 
stock of conventional typifications that allow us to recognize what 
is happening in our social world (Schütz 1970), and of more specific 
knowledge associated with our personal contacts. And we have the 
cognitive capacity to model other participants' states of mind as given 
interactions unfold (Mead 1934).
Accordingly, here is my rephrasing of Miller (with a debt to Schütz 
1970 and Sacks 1992): One o f  the man in the street's great methodological 
difficulties is how he can understand (and make himself understood to) his 
social associates solely on the basis o f  what is publicly observable. Any model 
of multiparty interaction will have to show how the combination of a 
physical environment and a set of mobile agents will result in emergence 
of the structures of interactional organization that we observe. It will 
also have to include descriptions of the individual agents, their internal 
structure and local goals. General capacities of social intelligence, 
and specific values of common ground will have to be represented 
somewhere in those individual minds. Then, in real contexts, what is 
emergent can emerge.
So, human social interaction not only involves cognition, it involves 
high-grade social intelligence (Goody 1995; allowing that it need not 
always involve it—Barr and Keysar 2004). And in line with a number of 
other contributors to this volume who resist the overuse or even abuse 
of mentalistic talk in the analysis of social interaction, it is clear that 
intention attribution is entirely dependent on perception in a shared 
environment (see esp. Byrne this volume, for his "heretical thought"; 
Danziger this volume; Goodwin 20Ô0, this volume; Hutchins 1995: 
ch. 9, this volume; Schegloff 1982:73). Both components—individual 
cognition and emergent organization—are absolutely necessary (see 
the introduction to this volume). Human social interaction would not 
exist as we know it without the cocktail of individual, higher-order 
cognition and situated, emergent, distributed organization. A mentalist 
stance need therefore not be at the expense of the critically important 
emergence of organization from collaborative action in shared physical 
context, above and beyond any individual's internally coded goals. To 
be sure, there remain major questions as to the relative contribution 
of individual cognition and situated collaborative action in causing 
the observed organization of interaction. But however you look at it, 
we need both.
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Audience Design
Equipped with higher-order inferential cognition, an interlocutor (plus 
all the other aspects of one's interactional context), and a stock of 
common ground, a speaker should design his or her utterances for 
that interlocutor (Clark 1996; Sacks 1992; Sacks and Schegloff 1979; 
Schegloff 1997). If we are to optimize the possibility of having our com­
municative intentions correctly recognized, any attempt to make the 
right inferences obvious to a hearer will have to take into account the 
common ground defined by the current speaker-hearer combination. In 
ordinary conversation, there is no generic, addressee-general, mode of 
message formulation. To get our communicative intentions recognized, 
we ought to do what we can to make them the most salient solutions 
to the interpretive problems we foist on our hearers. The right ways to 
achieve this will be determined in large part by what is in the common 
ground, and this is by definition a function of who is being addressed 
given who it is they are being addressed by. Because Gricean implicature 
is fundamentally audience driven (whereby formulation of an utterance 
is tailored by how one expects an addressee will receive it), to do audience 
design is to operate at a yet higher level than mere intention attribution. 
It entails advance modeling of another's intention attribution.5
Consider an example that turns on highly local common ground. Fig. 
15.5 shows two men sitting inside a Lao village house, waiting while 
lunch is prepared in an outside kitchen.
At the moment shown in Fig. 15.5, a woman's voice can be heard 
(coming from the outside kitchen verandah, behind the camera, left 
of screen) as follows:
(3) mdot4 nam4 haj5 neel
extinguish water benefactive please 
"Please turn off the water for (me)."
In making this request, the speaker does not explicitly select an 
addressee. Anyone in earshot is a potential addressee. Within a second 
or two, the man on the left of frame gets up and walks to an inside wall 
of the house, where he flicks an electric switch (Fig. 15.6).
Consider the mechanism by which the utterance in (3) brought 
about this man's compliance. Although the woman's call in (3) was 
not explicitly addressed to a particular individual, it was at the very 
least for someone who was in hearing range and knew what compliance 
with the request in (3) entailed. Although relative social rank of hearers 
may work to narrow down who is to carry out the request, it remains
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Figure 15.5. Two men waiting for lunch to be served, lowland Laos. Woman in 
kitchen (out of frame) is calling out "Please turn off the water!"
that the utterance in (3) could not be intended for someone who lacks 
the common ground, that is, who does not know what "turning off 
the water" involves. The switch that controls an outside water pump 
is situated at the only power outlet in the house, inside, far from the 
kitchen verandah. To respond appropriately to the utterance in (3), an 
addressee would need this inside knowledge of what "turning off the 
water" entails. Without it, one might iiot even realize that the addressee 
of (3) is someone (anyone) inside the house. But it is in the common 
ground for the people involved in this exchange. They are neighbors of 
this household, daily visitors to the house. The woman outside on the 
verandah knows that the people inside the house know (and know that 
they are known to know!) the routine of flicking that inside switch to 
turn the outside water pump on and off. This enables the success of the 
very lean communicative exchange consisting of the spoken utterance 
in (3) and the response in Fig. 15.6.
Much is inferred by the actor in Fig. 15.6 beyond what is encoded in 
the spoken message in (3), in the amplicative sense outlined above. In 
addition, this example illustrates a defining feature of common ground 
information, namely that people cannot deny possessing it.6 The man 
on our left in Fig. 15.5—who is situated nearest the switch—might not 
feel like getting up, but he could not use as an excuse for inaction a
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Figure 15.6. Man gets up to turn 
off switch of electric water pump.
claim that he does not know what the speaker in (3) wants (despite the 
fact that nothing in her utterance makes this explicit).
The principle of audience design dovetails with common ground, 
because both are defined by a particular social relationship between 
particular interlocutors. As prefigured above, the general imperative 
of audience design is served by two, more specific imperatives of 
conversation. I described one of these—the informational imperative—as 
the cooperative struggle to maintain common referential understanding, 
mutually calibrated at each step of an interaction's trajectory (Clark 
1996; Schegloff 1992). This will be satisfied by various means including 
choice of language spoken, choice of words, grammatical constructions, 
gestures, and the various devices for meeting "system requirements" 
for online alignment in interaction (mechanisms for turn organization, 
signals of ongoing recipiency, correction of errors and other problems, 
etc.; Goffman 1981:14; Schegloff this volume). Less well understood 
are the "ritual" requirements of remedial face work, and the need to
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deal with "implications regarding the character of the actor and his 
evaluation of his listeners, as well as reflecting on the relationships 
between him and them" (Goffman 1981:21; cf. Goffman 1967, 1971). 
We turn now to those.
The Affiliational Imperative in Social Interaction
Any time one is engaged in social interaction, one's actions are of real 
consequence to the social relationship currently being exercised. If 
you are acting too distant, or too intimate, you are most likely going 
to be held accountable for it. Heritage and Atkinson (1984:6) write that 
there is "no escape or time out" from the consequences of interaction's 
sequential, contextual nature. Similarly, there is no escape or time out 
from the social-relational consequences of interaction. Just as each little 
choice we make in communicative interaction can be assessed for its 
optimality for information exchange, it can equally be assessed for its 
optimality for maintaining (or forging) the current social relationship 
at an appropriate level of intensity or intimacy. The management of 
common ground is directly implicated in our perpetual attendance to 
managing personal relationships within our social networks. Next, I 
elaborate some mechanisms by which this is achieved, but first I want 
to flesh out what is meant by degrees of intimacy or intensity in social 
relationships.
One of the key tasks of navigating social life is maintaining positions 
in social networks, where relationships between individuals are carried 
through time, often for years on end. There are logical constraints on 
the nature of an individual's network of relationships thanks to an 
inverse relationship between time spent interacting with any individual, 
and number of individuals with whom one interacts. We have only so 
much time in the day, and sustained relationships cannot be multiplied 
beyond a certain threshold (cf. grooming among primates; Dunbar 
1993, 1996). Spending more time interacting with certain individuals 
means more opportunities to increment common ground with those 
individuals, by virtue of the greater opportunity to engage in joint 
attentional activity such as conversation. This results in greater access 
to amplicative inference in communication. A corollary is having less 
time to interact with others, and thus less chance to increment common 
ground through personal contact with those others, and, in turn, less 
potential to exploit amplicative inference in communication with 
them.
Such considerations of the logical dynamics of time and social group 
size have been taken to suggest inherent biases in the organization of
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social network structure (Dunbar 1998; Dunbar and Spoors 1995; Hill 
and Dunbar 2003). Hill and Dunbar suggest that social networks are 
"hierarchically differentiated, with larger numbers of progressively less 
intense relationships maintained at higher levels' (2003:67; cf. Dunbar 
1998). They propose a model with inclusive levels (Hill and Dunbar 
2003:68; note that they also discuss groupings at higher levels than 
this):
(4) Level of relationship intensity Approximate size of group
support clique 7
sympathy group 21
band 35
social group 150
What defines membership in one or other of these levels? As with 
physical grooming among primates, those who I spend more time with 
in committed engagement will tend to be those who I can later rely on 
in times of trouble (and, similarly, to whom I will be obliged to offer 
help if needed). In some societies this will be somewhat preordained 
(e.g., by kin or equivalently fixed social relations), whereas in other types 
of societies people may be more freely selective (as in many modern 
urban settings). For humans, unlike in primitive physical grooming, 
such rounds of engagement are intertwined with the deployment of 
delicate and sophisticated symbolic structure (language), and so it is 
not (just?) a matter of how long we spend interacting with whom, but of 
what kind o f  information is traded and thereby invested in common ground. 
This is why in one type of society I might have a more intensive, closer 
relationship with my best friend, even though I see very much less of 
him than my day-to-day professional colleagues.
Cultures will differ with respect to the determination of relationship 
intensity (quantitatively and qualitatively defined), and the practices by 
which such intensity is maintained and signaled. Hill and Dunbar suggest 
that a hierarchical structure of social relatedness like (4), above, will be 
maintained in more or less any cultural setting, but the qualitative basis 
for distinction between these levels in any given culture will be "wholly 
open to negotiation" (i.e., by the traditions of that culture; 2003:69). 
They cite various types of social practice that may locally define the 
relevant level of relationship: those from whom we get our "hair care" 
(among the !Kung San; Sugawara 1984), those "whose death would be 
personally devastating" (Buys and Larson 1979), those "from whom 
one would seek advice, support, or help in times of severe emotional or 
financial stress" (Dunbar and Spoors 1995), those to whom we would 
send Christmas cards (Hill and Dunbar 2003; the other citations in
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this sentence are also from Hill and Dunbar 2003:67). An important 
empirical project is the investigation of commonality and difference in 
how people of different cultures mark these social distinctions through 
interactional practice (regardless of whether membership in different 
levels of relationship intensity in a given setting is socioculturally 
predetermined, or selected by individuals' preference).
Practices concerned with the management of common ground for 
strategic interactional purposes provide, I suggest, an important kind 
of data for assessing Hill and Dunbar's proposal. Given the "no time 
out" nature of everyday interaction, we may better look to practices 
that are very much more mundane and constant in the lives of regularly 
interacting individuals than, say, annual gestures like the Anglo Christmas 
Card. To this end, I want to draw a key link, so far entirely unseen in the 
literature, it seems, between the line of thinking exemplified by Hill and 
Dunbar (2003), and a strand of work arising from research within corners 
of sociology on conversation and other types of interaction, rooted in 
the work of Sacks and associates on "social membership categorization" 
(cf. Sacks 1992; see also Garfinkel and Sacks 1970; Schegloff in press b). 
In a review of this work, Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (2005) outline 
four types of practice in U.S. English conversation by which people 
"maintain incumbency in complementary relationship categories, such 
as friend-friend, intimate-intimate, father-son, by engaging in conduct 
regarded as appropriate for incumbents of the relationship category and 
by ratifying appropriate conduct when performed by the cointeractant" 
(Pomerantz and Mandelbaum 2005:160):
(5) Four sets of practices for maintaining incumbency in more intensive/ 
intimate types of social relationships (derived from Pomerantz and 
Mandelbaum 2005):
■ "Inquiring about tracked events and providing more details on one's 
own activities": reporting and updating on events and activities 
mentioned in previous conversations; eliciting detailed accounts, 
demonstrating special interest in the details; attending to each 
other's schedules and plans; and so forth (Drew and Chilton 2000; 
Morrison 1997).
■ "Discussing one's own problems and displaying interest in the 
other's problems": claiming the right to (and being obliged to) ask 
and display interest in each other's personal problems; showing 
receptivity to such discussion; and so forth (Cohen 1999; Jefferson 
and Lee 1980).
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■ "Making oblique references to shared experiences and forwarding 
the talk about shared experiences": one party makes minimal 
reference to past shared experience (e.g., John says Remember Mary's 
brother?), and the other displays their recognition of it, takes it up 
and forwards it in the conversation (Fred responds Oh God, he's so 
strange, what about when he. ..), thereby demonstrating the common 
ground (Lerner 1992; Mandelbaum 1987; Maynard and Zimmerman 
1984; cf. Enfield 2003).
■ "Using improprieties and taking up the other's improprieties by 
using additional improprieties and/or laughter": cussing and other 
obscenities; laughter in response to such improprieties; shared 
suspension of constraints usually imposed by politeness (Jefferson 
1974).
At least the first three of these cases are squarely concerned with the 
strategic manipulation of information—the incrementing, maintaining, 
or presupposing of common ground—with consequences for the 
relationship and for its maintenance.7 These are important candidates 
for local, culturally variant practices for maintaining social membership 
in one or another level (the examples in (5) being all definitive of "closer" 
relationships). Whether these are universal is an empirical question. It 
requires close analysis of social interaction based on naturally occurring, 
informal conversation across cultures and in different types of social- 
cultural systems.
I now want to elaborate with further examples of social practices 
from specific cultural settings that show particular attention to the 
maintenance of social relationships at various levels. In line with the 
theme of the chapter, they concentrate on the management of, or 
presupposition of, common ground, with both informational payoffs 
and social-affiliational payoffs.
A first example, from Schegloff (in press a), is a practice that arises in 
the cultural context of Anglo-American telephone calls (at least before 
the era of caller ID displays). It hinges on the presumption that people 
in close social relationships should be able to recognize each other by 
a minimal voice sample alone. Here is an example:
(6) 1 ((ring))
2 Clara: Hello
3 Agnes: Hi
4 Clara: Oh hi, how are you Agnes
416 Cognition in Interaction
This typical case displays an exquisite minimality and efficiency, 
which puts on mutual display to the interlocutors the intimacy of their 
relationship, thanks to the mutual presumption of person recognition 
based on minimal information. In line 1, Clara hears the phone ring. 
When she picks up, in line 2, she does not identify herself by saying 
who she is. She gives a voice sample carried by the generic formula 
hello. If the caller is socially close enough to the callee, he or she will 
recognize her by her voice (biased by expectation, given that one usually 
knows who one is calling). On hearing this, Schegloff explains, by 
supplying the minimal greeting response Hi in line 3, the caller "claims 
to have recognized the answerer as the person they meant to reach." 
(Otherwise—i.e., if the caller did not recognize the answerer—he or she 
would have to ask, or at least ask for confirmation; e.g. Clara?.) At the 
same time, the caller in line 3 is reversing the direction of this minimal- 
identifying mechanism, providing "a voice sample to the answerer from 
which callers, in effect, propose and require that the answerer recognize 
them." In this seamless and lightning-fast exchange, these interactants 
challenge each to recognize the other given the barest minimum of 
information, and through the course of the exchange each of them 
claim to have achieved that recognition. (Clara not only claims but 
demonstrates recognition by producing Agnes's name in line 4.) Were 
they not to recognize who was calling on the basis of a small sample of 
speech like hi—which, after all, was produced on the presumption that 
the quality of the voice should be sufficient for a close social associate 
to identify the person—they would pay a social price of disaffiliation 
via a betrayal of distance and lack of intimacy (What? You don't recognize 
me?!; cf. Schegloff in press b). t 
Consider a second example, another practice by which social inter­
actants identify persons. In English, when referring to a nonpresent 
person in an informal conversation, a speaker may choose whether to 
use bare first name (John) as opposed to some fuller name (John Smith) or 
description (my attorney, Bill's brother, that guy there; Sacks and Schegloff 
1979, Enfield and Stivers in press). The choice depends on whether it is 
in speaker and addressee's common ground who "John" is and whether 
he is openly known to this speaker-addressee pair as John. The choices 
we make will, in general, reflect the level of intimacy and intensity of 
social relations among speaker, addressee, and referent, and this more 
directly concerns the common ground of speaker and addressee. In 
my example (Fig. 15.7), Kou (left) has just arrived at his village home, 
having been driven from the city (30 or so km away) in a pickup. He 
has brought with him a load of passengers, mostly children, who have
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Figure 15.7. Kou (light shirt) has just arrived at his village home in a pickup 
truck loaded with passengers, mostly children. Saj (dark shirt), a neighbor, comes 
by to investigate.
now scattered and are playing in the grounds of his compound. Saj 
(right), a neighbor of Kou, has just arrived on the scene.
Saj asks Kou how many people were in the group that has just arrived 
with Kou's vehicle, following this up immediately by offering a candidate 
set of people: "Duang's lot" (line 1). The named referent—Duang—is 
Kou's third daughter.8 Kou responds with a list of those who have arrived 
with him, beginning by listing four of his own daughters by name (lines 
2-3), then mentioning two further children (line 4):
(7)
1 S maa2 cak2 khon2 ni0 -  suml qiil+duang3 kao maa2
come how_many person tpc_pcl group f.non_resp+D foc_pcl come 
"How many people have come?—Duang's lot have come?"
2 K qiil+duang3 -  qiil+daa3, qiil+phoon2
f.non_resp+D f.non_resp+D f.non_resp+P
"Duang -  Daa, Phoon.
3 maa2 bet2 leq5, qiil+khoon2van3 
come all pfv f.non_resp+K
All have come, Khoonvan.
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4 dek2+nooj4 maa2 teel paak5_san2 phuno qiik5 soong3 khon2 
child come from P dem_far_dist more two person
Kids from Paksan, another two.
It is in the common ground that Kou's own four children are known 
to both Kou and Saj by their first names. Kou is therefore able to use 
the four children's personal names in lines 2-3 to achieve recognition. 
In line 4, Kou continues his list, with two further children who have 
arrived with him. These two are not his own, are not from this village, 
and are presumed not to be known by name to Saj. They are children of 
Kou's brother and sister, respectively, who both live in Kou's mother's 
village Paksan, some distance away. Kou refers to them as "kids from 
Paksan." The reason he does not he refer to these two children by name 
is that he figures his addressee will not recognize them by name—their 
names, as ways of uniquely referring to them, are not in the common 
ground. But although Saj certainly will not recognize the children by 
name, he will recognize their village of origin by name (and further, 
will recognize that village to be Kou's village of origin, and the home 
of Kou's siblings). So Kou's solution to the problem of formulating 
reference to these two children—in line 4—is to tie them to one sure 
piece of common ground: the name of the village where a host of Kou's 
relatives are (openly, mutually) known to live.
However, it appears that Kou's solution in line 4 is taken—by Saj—to 
suppose too little common ground. Although Saj would not know the 
names of these Paksan children, he does know the names of some of Kou's 
siblings from Paksan. This is common knowledge, which could form 
the basis of a finer characterization of these children's identities than 
that offered in line 4. What immediately follows Kou's vague reference 
to the two children by place of origin in line 4 is Saj's candidate offer of 
a more specific reference to the children. Saj's candidate reformulation 
(line 5 in [8], below) links the children explicitly to one of Kou's siblings, 
referring to him by name. This guess, which turns out to be not entirely 
correct, succeeds in eliciting from Kou a finer characterization of the 
children's identities (line 6). This new characterization presupposes 
greater common ground than Kou's first attempt did in line 4, yet it 
remains a step away in implied social proximity from that implied 
by Kou's first-name formulations to his own children in lines 2-3, 
above:
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(8) (Follows directly from (7).)
5 S luuk4 qaj0+saaj3
child eB+S 
"Children of Saaj?"
6 K luuk4 bak2+saaj3 phuu5 nungl, luuk4 - qiil+vaat4sa=naa3 phuu5 nungl
child m.non_resp+S person one child f.non_resp+V person one 
"Child of Saaj, one, child of -  Vatsana, one."
The contrasts between the three ways to formulate reference to a 
person—by first name in lines 1-3, via place of origin in line 4, via 
parent's name in lines 5-6—represent appeals to common ground 
of different kinds, and different degrees. They are indicative of, and 
constitutive of, different levels of social familiarity and proximity. This 
example shows how such expression of these levels of familiarity can be 
explicitly negotiated within the very business of social interaction. Kou's 
reference to the two children from Paksan in line 4 was constructed 
differently to the references to his own children in lines 2-3, but 
Saj effectively requested, and elicited, a revision of the first-attempt 
formulation in line 5, thereby securing a display of greater common 
ground than had a moment before been presupposed.9
A third example involves two men in a somewhat more distant 
relationship. This is from an exchange between the two men pictured 
on the left of Figs 15.2-15.4. (I call them Foreground Man [FM] and 
Background Man [BM].) The men hardly know each other, but are 
of a similar age. The younger sister of BM's younger brother's wife is 
married to the son of FM. The two men seldom meet. Their kinship ties 
are distant. Their home territories—the areas about which they should 
naturally be expected to have good knowledge—overlap partially. They 
originate in villages that are a day's travel apart. This is far enough to 
make it likely that they have spent little time in each other's territory, 
but it is not so far that they would be expected not to have ever done so. 
The common ground at stake, then, concerns knowledge of the land.
The conversation takes place in the village of FM. This is therefore 
an occasion in which BM is gathering firsthand experience beyond his 
home territory. It may be inferred from the segment we are about to 
examine that FM wants to display his familiarity with BM's territory. 
The point of interest in this conversation is a series of references to 
a geographical location close to BM's home village, but which FM 
apparently knows well about. During a discussion of medicinal herbs, 
BM mentions an area in which certain herbs can be found. His first 
mention of the place is by name: Vang Pheeng.10 As with reference to
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persons (see previous example), the use of the bare name in first mention 
presupposes recognizability or identifiability (Schegloff 1972). This 
identifiability is immediately confirmed by FM's reply of "Yeah, there's 
no shortage (of that herb) there." There is then over a minute's further 
discussion of the medicine, before the following sequence begins:11
(9)
1 BM haak4 phang2 khii5 kaO bdO qut2 juul [theew3-
root PK foe neg lacking at area
"Hak phang khii (a type of medicinal root) is plentiful, at the area of-"
2 FM [qee5
yeah
"Yeah,
3 kaO cangl vaal faaj3 vang2 pheeng2 faaj3 nang3 qooj4 
foe so say weir VP weir what intj 
Like I said, Vang Pheeng Weir, whatever weir, oh."
4 BM m5
mm
"Mm."
5 FM bdO qut2 leq5, faaj3 qanO nanO naO
neg lacking pfv weir elf that pci
"It's not lacking (medicinal roots and herbs), that weir.
6 te0+kii4 haak5 vang2 pheeng2 nan4 te0+kii4 khaw3 paj3 teq2-toong4 
before pci VP that before 3pl go touch 
Before, Vang Pheeng, before for them to go and touch it
7 bdO daj4, paal_dong3 m an 2 le^ vO dej2 
neg can forest 3sg pci pci
was impossible, the forest of itnon_respect, you know."
In line I, BM mentions a type of herbal medicine, saying that it is 
plentiful. He is about to mention the location in which it is plentiful, 
as projected by the use of the locational marker glossed in line 1 as "at." 
Not only does FM anticipate this, but also anticipates which location 
it is that BM is about to mention (in a form of anticipation directly 
related to that in the more simple example shown in Figs 15.2-15.4), 
namely Vang Pheeng Weir (line 3) (cf. Lerner 1996 on collaborative 
turn completion.) This is confirmed by BM's acknowledgement marker 
mm in line 4. Again, we see a dance of display of common ground, by 
anticipation of what the current speaker is going to say. FM goes on to 
comment in lines 6-7 that in the old days it was impossible to collect 
medicinal herbs from the area.
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The element of special interest here is the pronoun man2 "it" in bold 
face in line 7. There is no local antecedent for this pronoun. The speaker 
is using a locally subsequent form in a locally initial position (Fox 
1987; Schegloff 1996), with a subsequent major risk of not succeeding 
in getting recognition. How do his addressees know what he is talking 
about? (We get evidence that BM at least claims to follow him, as we see 
BM in the video doing an acknowledging "head toss"—something like 
a nod—directed to FM just as the latter utters line 7.) A couple of lines 
ensue (omitted here to save space), which finish with FM repeating that 
in the old days it was impossible to get medicinal herbs out of there. 
Then, Foreground Woman (FW) contributes:
(10)
8 FW khuam2 p h en l haaj4 niO naO
reason 3sg.hon angry pci pci 
"Owing to it'srespect being angry?"
9 FM qee5 -  bôôl mèèn2 lin5 lin5 dêj2, phii3 vang2 phêêng2 niO
yeah neg be play play pci spirit VP tpc.pcl
"Yeah -  It's not playing around you know, the spirit of Vang Phêêng."
Line 8, uttered by FW (BM's wife) partly reveals her analysis of what 
FM is saying, and specifically of what he was referring to by the 3rd 
person singular pronoun man2 in line 7. She, too, uses a 3rd-person 
singular pronoun, but her choice is the honorific phenl. She suggests 
that the previous difficulty in extracting herbs was because of "the anger 
of it." Someone who lacks the relevant cultural common ground will 
have no way of knowing that the referent of "it" is the spirit owner 
of Vang Phêêng. This is not made explicit until it seems obvious that 
everyone already knows what the speaker has been talking about—that 
is, as a demonstrative afterthought in line 9.
This exchange reveals to the analyst the extent to which recognition 
of quite specific references can be elicited using very minimal forms 
for reference when those involved in the social interaction share a 
good deal of common ground (cf. [3] and Figs 15.5 and 15.6). It also 
makes important indications to the participants themselves. They 
display to each other, in a way hardly possible to bluff, that they 
share specific common ground. In line 3 of (9), FM anticipates what 
BM is going to say, and says it for him. In line 7, FM uses a nearly 
contentless pronoun to refer to a new entity in the discourse, relying 
entirely on shared knowledge and expectation to achieve successful 
recognition.12 In line 8, FW displays her successful recognition of the 
referent introduced by FM in line 7, by making explicit something
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about the referent that up to this point has been merely implied. By 
the economy and brevity of these exchanges, these individuals display 
to each other—and to us as onlookers—that they share a great deal of 
common knowledge, including common knowledge of the local area 
(and the local biographical commitment this indexes), and membership 
in the local culture. This may be of immense value for negotiating the 
vaguely defined level of interpersonal relationship pertaining between 
the two men, whose only reason for interacting is their affinal kinship. 
In conversing, they test for, and display common ground, and through 
the interplay of their contributions to the progressing trajectory of talk 
demonstrate an unbluffable ability to know what is being talked about 
before it is even mentioned.
Conclusion
This chapter has proposed that the practices by which we manage 
and exploit common ground in interaction demonstrate a personal 
commitment to particular relationships and particular communities, 
and a studied attention to the practical and strategic requirements 
of human sociality. I have argued that the manipulation of common 
ground serves both interactional efficacy and social affiliation. The logic 
can be summarized as follows. Common ground—knowledge openly 
shared by specified pairs, trios, and so forth—is by definition socially 
relational, and relationship defining. In an informational dimension, 
common ground guides the design of signals by particular speakers 
for particular recipients, as well as the proper interpretation by particular 
recipients, of signals from particular speakers. Richer common ground 
means greater communicative economy, because it enables greater 
amplicative inferences on the basis of leaner coded signals. In a social- 
affiliational dimension, the resulting streamlined, elliptical interaction 
has a property that is recognized and exploited in the ground-level 
management of social relations: these indices of common ground are 
a means of publicly displaying, to interactants and onlookers alike, 
that the requisite common ground is shared, and that the relationship 
constituted by that degree or kind of common ground is in evidence.
In sum, common ground is as much a social-affiliational resource as 
it is an informational one. In its home disciplines of linguistics and 
psychology, the defining properties of common ground concern its 
consequences in the realm of reference and discourse coherence. But 
sharedness, or not, of information, is essentially social. Why else would 
it be that if I were to get the promotion, I had better tell my wife as
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soon as I see her (or better, call her and let her be the first to know), 
whereas others can be told in due course (my snooker buddies), and 
yet others need never know (my dentist)? The critical point, axiomatic 
in research on talk in interaction yet alien to linguistics and cognitive 
science, is that there is no time out from the social consequences of 
communicative action.
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Notes
1. See also Schiffer (1972), Sperberand Wilson (1995), D'Andrade (1987:113), 
Searle (1995:23-26), Schegloff (1996:459), Barr and Keysar (2004). Although 
analysts agree that humans can construct and consult common ground in 
interaction, there is considerable disagreement as to how pervasive it is (see 
discussion in Barr and Keysar 2004).
2. By "hypothesis," I do not mean that we need consciously or explicitly 
entertain candidate accounts for questions like whether our colleagues will 
wear clothes to work tomorrow, or whether the sun will come up, or whether 
we will stop feeling thirsty after we have had a drink (saying "Aha, just as I 
suspected" when verified). But we nevertheless have models of how things are, 
which, most importantly, are always accessible, and become visible precisely
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when things go against our expectations (Whorf 1956). For this to work, 
we need some kind of stored representation, whether mental or otherwise 
embodied, which accounts for our expectations.
3. Steve Levinson points out the relevance of the great spatial distance 
between BW and the basket. Her reach has a long way to go when FW acts on 
the inference derived from observing her action. It may be that BW's stylized 
reach was overtly communicative, designed to induce recognition of intention, 
and the perlocutionary effect of causing FW to pass the basket (functioning, 
effectively, as a request).
4. The phrasing appropriates Slobin's thinking-for-speaking idea: that "lan­
guage directs us to attend—while speaking—to the dimensions of experience 
that are enshrined in grammatical categories" (Slobin 1996:71).
5. There is some controversy as to the extent to which we do audience 
design and assume its having been done. By a frugal cognition view, audience 
design is heavily minimized, but all analytical positions acknowledge that 
high-powered inference must at the very least be available when required 
(Barr and Keysar 2004; cf. Goodwin, Hutchins, and Danziger in this volume).
6. This is the corollary of the impossibility of pretending to possess common 
ground when you do not: witness the implausibility of fictional stories in 
which characters assume other characters' identities and impersonate them, 
living their lives without their closest friends and kin detecting that they are 
imposters (e.g., the reciprocal face transplant performed on arch enemies 
Castor Troy and Sean Archer in Face/Off, Paramount Pictures, 1997).
7. More work is needed to understand how the use of profanities works 
to display and constitute "close" social relations. Presumably, the mechanism 
is that "we can't talk like that with everybody." So, it is not a question of the 
propositional content of the informatibn being exchanged, but its register, 
its format. Compare this with more sophisticated ways of displaying social 
affiliation in the animal world, such as the synchronized swimming and 
diving that closely affiliated porpoises employ as a display of alliance (Connor 
et al. 2000:104). It is not just that these individuals are swimming together, 
but, in addition, how they are doing it.
8. Like the others in this list of names, Duang is socially "lower" than 
both the participants, and accordingly, her name is prefixed with the female 
nonrespect prefix qiil-; cf. Enfield (in press).
9. I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Manny Schegloff and 
Tanya Stivers to my understanding of this example.
10. The Lao word vang refers to a river pool, a section of river in which the 
water is deep and not perceptibly flowing, usually with thick forest towering 
over it, producing a slightly spooky atmosphere, of the kind associated with 
spirit owners (i.e., ghosts or spirits that "own" a place, and must be appeased
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when traveling through). The same place is also called Faaj Vang Pheeng (faaj 
means "weir"; the deep still water of Vang Pheeng is a weir reservoir).
11. Vertically aligned square brackets indicate overlap in speech.
12. This is comparable with the use of him in the opening words of Paul 
Bremer's announcement at a Baghdad news conference in December 2003 of 
the highly anticipated capture of Saddam Hussein: "Ladies and gentlemen, we 
got him."
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